United States v. James by unknown
1996 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-4-1996 
United States v. James 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1996 
Recommended Citation 
"United States v. James" (1996). 1996 Decisions. 209. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1996/209 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1996 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
____________________ 
 
NO. 95-3135 
_____________________ 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                            Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
KEITH JAMES, 
                          Appellant. 
 
_____________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
D.C. No. 94-224 
____________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)  December 8, 1995 
Before:   STAPLETON, SAROKIN, and ROSENN, Circuit Judges 
 
Filed:  March 4, 1996 
 
 
Bonnie R. Schlueter, Esq. 
Office of United States Attorney 
633 United States Post Office & Courthouse 
Pittsburgh, PA  15219 
 Counsel for Appellee 
 
Thomas Livingston, Esq. 
205 Ross Street 
The Colonial Building 
Pittsburgh, PA  15219 
 Counsel for Appellant 
 
 
______________________ 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________________ 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
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 This appeal primarily presents for consideration 
questions concerning whether a civil forfeiture of an automobile 
used in the sale of illegal drugs constitutes punishment under 
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution, and whether the 
Government must prove for purposes of sentence enhancement that 
cocaine base constitutes crack cocaine.  Appellant Keith James 
pleaded guilty to possession and distribution of cocaine base in 
violation of 28 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(iii).  The 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania sentenced James to 108 months imprisonment pursuant 
to Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1.  This section provides 
for an enhanced sentence for the sale of "crack" cocaine.  Prior 
to sentencing, the Government seized James's 1986 Buick LeSabre, 
pursuant to the forfeiture provisions contained in 21 U.S.C. 
§881(a)(4).  
 James appeals his sentence on several grounds,1 two of 
which merit discussion:  (1) whether the judgment of sentence for 
sale of cocaine base subsequent to the administrative forfeiture 
of James's automobile is a second punishment for the same offense 
in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment; and (2) whether the Government must prove at 
sentencing that the substance James sold was "crack," a 
                     
1The district court properly exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. § 3231.  This court may hear the appeal from the 
judgment of sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 
§3742(a). 
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particular form of cocaine base subject to severe enhancement 
under the Sentencing Guidelines.2    
 We see no merit to James's double jeopardy argument. 
Because we believe, however, that the Government did not prove at 
sentencing that James sold crack cocaine, James's sentence will 
be vacated and the case remanded to the district court for re-
sentencing consistent with this opinion. 
 
I. 
 
 On June 29, 1994, July 1, 1994 and July 11, 1994 James 
sold cocaine base, allegedly aggregating 57.4 grams, to a 
confidential informant.  Undercover agents of a Drug Enforcement 
Administration Task Force monitored the transactions.  The agents 
arrested James on September 19, 1994, and seized his 1986 Buick, 
                     
2James also asserts the following arguments on appeal: (1) the 
Sentencing Guideline provisions which provide for exponentially 
harsher sentences for crack cocaine than for other forms of 
cocaine violate the Equal Protection component of the Fifth 
Amendment; and (2) the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions of 
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) are ambiguous, thus the court 
should apply the Sentencing Guidelines provisions for powder 
cocaine, pursuant to the Rule of Lenity.  We reject these 
arguments as meritless.  
 
 James further asserts that the enhanced sentence for 
crack cocaine is arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, in light of the 
Sentencing Commission's recent criticism of the crack 
enhancement.  Although we empathize with the Commission's 
recommendations with respect to sentence enhancement for crack as 
against cocaine powder, Congress has rejected the 
recommendations, leaving the court with no alternative but to 
reject the above argument as meritless. 
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which he used in all three transactions.  One month later, the 
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) notified James of the forfeiture 
proceedings for his automobile, and alerted him as to the 
procedures to contest the forfeiture.  James did not contest the 
forfeiture, and thus, prior to sentencing, forfeited his interest 
in the Buick to the United States.   
 James pleaded guilty to selling 57.4 grams of cocaine 
base.  At sentencing, the court rejected James's arguments 
referred to above.  The court sentenced James to 108 months 
imprisonment, the minimum sentence available under the Sentencing 
Guidelines for the possession and distribution of crack cocaine.  
 
II. 
 
 We will first review James's claim that the 
administrative forfeiture of his automobile constitutes 
punishment for the same offense for which he was sentenced 
criminally in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.  Review of the district court's ruling is 
plenary.  See Fabulous Assoc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 896 F.2d 
780, 783 (3rd Cir. 1990) (court must exercise independent 
appellate review in constitutional matters). 
 James drove the Buick LeSabre that he co-owned with his 
mother to the drug transactions.  Subsequent to James's arrest, 
the Government seized the car pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), 
which provides, in pertinent part: 
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(a) Property subject 
 
 The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the 
United States and no property right shall exist in them: 
 
(4) All conveyances used . . . to transport, or . 
. . facilitate the . . . sale [of cocaine]. 
 
   21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4). 
 
 
 The Government then notified James in writing of the 
forfeiture proceedings and the legal methods to contest the 
proceedings.  James asserts that he did not contest the 
forfeiture proceedings because to do so would have been an 
"exercise in futility."  
 Prior to his sentencing hearing, James filed a Motion 
to Bar Imposition of Sentence in the district court.  He asserted 
that the forfeiture of the Buick was punishment, thus a 
subsequent judgment of sentence would constitute a second 
punishment for the same offense, in violation of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.   
 The Double Jeopardy Clause provides: 
[N]or shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb. 
   
U.S. Const. amdt. 5. 
 
 The Supreme Court has noted that the Clause "protects 
against three distinct abuses:  a second prosecution for the same 
offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same 
offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same 
offense."   See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 
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(1989).  James asserts that his subsequent sentencing violates 
the prohibition against multiple punishments.    
 This court recently held that prosecution subsequent to 
an administrative forfeiture does not subject a defendant to 
double jeopardy, because an administrative forfeiture does not 
constitute former jeopardy.  See United States v. Baird, No. 95-
1202 (3rd Cir. August 11, 1995).  In Baird, law enforcement 
officials searched the defendant's residence on the suspicion 
that he was manufacturing and selling a drug called "Ecstacy." 
The officials seized drugs and manufacturing equipment, along 
with $2,582 cash.  The DEA invoked administrative forfeiture of 
the seized cash under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6).  The defendant 
claimed that the administrative forfeiture of the cash barred 
subsequent criminal proceedings.    
 The defendant in Baird noted that recent Supreme Court 
decisions have expanded the concept of punishment under the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.  See Montana Dept. of Rev. v. Kurth 
Ranch, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (1994) (state tax 
imposed on possession and storage of dangerous drugs constituted 
second punishment for purposes of Double Jeopardy Clause); Austin 
v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2806 (1993) 
(relying on Halper to determine that civil forfeiture pursuant to 
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) and (7) constitutes punishment for the 
purposes of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause); 
Halper, 490 U.S. at 449 (civil sanctions may constitute 
punishment for double jeopardy purposes to the extent they serve 
traditional goals of punishment--deterrence and retribution).   
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 In Baird, the defendant asserted that these Supreme 
Court cases establish that the administrative forfeiture of money 
constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes.  See Baird 
slip op. at 6.  Although the Supreme Court did hold that, under 
certain circumstances, multiple punishment may constitute double 
jeopardy, this court found that the forfeiture proceedings in 
Baird did not constitute double jeopardy.  The court noted the 
distinction between civil and administrative forfeiture 
proceedings.  It asserted: 
[A]dministrative forfeiture is only appropriate in 
cases where the seized property in question goes 
unclaimed.  Without overstating it, administrative 
forfeiture is, in reality, a non-proceeding -- it 
is merely the consequence of no one having come 
forward to claim the property seized or contest 
its forfeitability. 
   
Id. at 8.  
 
 The court went on to explain that the defendant's 
administrative forfeiture of unclaimed alleged drug proceeds 
could not be held to constitute punishment for double jeopardy 
purposes.  If this were the only holding in Baird, the instant 
case would appear to be distinguishable.  In this case, it is 
undisputed that James and his mother owned the automobile that 
was forfeited.  This tends to support James's argument that the 
forfeiture was "punishment."  See Baird, slip op. at 19 (Sarokin, 
J., dissenting) (in rem forfeiture serves, at least in part, to 
punish the owner).  The court in Baird assumed arguendo, however, 
that the defendant was the owner of the forfeited money and 
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nonetheless concluded that the significant factor was the failure 
of anyone to contest the forfeiture proceedings. 
 The court held that because the defendant in Baird 
failed to contest the forfeiture, he never became a party to the 
administrative proceeding.  Thus, the defendant could not prevail 
on the double jeopardy claim.  Id. at 12.  The court also noted 
that "no one may be 'punished' in a manner relevant to the Double 
Jeopardy Clause without first having been subjected to some form 
of judicial procedure, either in the form of a criminal 
prosecution or the 'functional equivalent' thereof."  Baird, slip 
op. at 12 n.11 (emphasis in original) (citing Ex Parte Lange, 85 
U.S. 163, 176 (1874)).  In this case, James also failed to become 
a party to the forfeiture proceeding, and it was merely 
administrative and not judicial.   See also United States v. 
Torres, 28 F.3d 1463, 1464-65 (7th Cir. 1994) (when defendant is 
not a party to forfeiture proceedings, jeopardy does not attach, 
and further prosecution will not constitute double jeopardy); 
United States v. Kemmish, 869 F. Supp. 803, 805 (S.D. Cal. 1994) 
("Even where the unclaimed property is titled in the name of some 
person, personal rights protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause 
are not affected by the forfeiture of the property through 
administrative proceedings."). 
 This court's decision in Baird controls the instant 
case.  James did not contest the forfeiture of his automobile. 
Thus, no former jeopardy attached, and James may not prevail on 
his double jeopardy claim.  We therefore hold that when a 
defendant in a criminal case invokes the Double Jeopardy Clause 
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because of a prior administrative forfeiture of property, but 
fails to contest the forfeiture proceeding or become a party to 
it, jeopardy has not attached. 
 
 
 
 
III. 
 
 James asserts that the district court should not have 
sentenced him pursuant to the Sentencing Guideline's crack 
cocaine enhancement provision.  This court has plenary review of 
issues of law raised by the district court's application of the 
Sentencing Guidelines.  See United States v. Mobley, 956 F.2d 450 
(3rd Cir. 1992).  
   The district court sentenced James pursuant to Section 
2D1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines.  Section 2D1.1 provides that 
the court use the same base offense level for a crime involving 
1.5 kilograms or more of cocaine base that it would use for a 
crime involving 150 kilograms or more of cocaine.  Thus, an 
enhanced sentence or "100:1 ratio" exists in crimes involving 
cocaine base, compared to cocaine, as defined in the Guidelines. 
 In 1993, the Sentencing Commission amended the 
Guidelines to include the following definition of cocaine base: 
"Cocaine base," for the purposes of this 
guideline, means "crack."  "Crack" is the street 
name for a form of cocaine base, usually prepared 
by processing cocaine hydrochloride and sodium 
10 
bicarbonate, and usually appearing in a lumpy, 
rocklike form. 
   
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 
 
 James contends that, by this definition, Section 2D1.1 
expressly recognizes that "crack" is one form, among others, of 
"cocaine base," and the only form that is subject to the 
sentencing enhancements of Section 2D1.1.  He asserts that the 
Government has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the 
evidence, not merely that the substance in question was cocaine 
base, but that it was a particular form of cocaine base, "crack," 
as defined in the Guidelines.   
 James's indictment charged him with distribution and 
possession of a "substance containing a detectable amount of 
cocaine base."  The government laboratory analysis reported the 
substance as "cocaine base."  In addition, James's plea agreement 
stated: 
The parties stipulate, for purposes of determining 
Keith Henry James' offense level under the 
Sentencing Guidelines, that the relevant quantity 
of cocaine base is 57.4 grams.  
 
 In the plea colloquy, the trial judge directed this 
specific question to the defendant: 
Q.  Now Mr. James, did you, as charged in Count 
One of the indictment . . . knowingly, 
intentionally and unlawfully distribute in excess 
of five grams of a mixture and substance 
containing a detectable amount of cocaine base? 
 
A.  Yes. 
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Given this record, James asserts that the district court erred in 
applying the enhanced sentence for crack because he never pleaded 
guilty to possession or distribution of "crack." 
 The Government contends that the court need not reach 
the issue of the Guidelines treatment of crack versus cocaine 
base.  It asserts that James waived his right to contest the 
enhanced sentence by admitting in the plea colloquy that he sold 
crack.  The problem arises because the indictment, the defendant, 
and the court at the plea colloquy speak in terms of cocaine 
base.  Government counsel, however, refers to the contraband as 
"crack cocaine."  Thus, at the plea colloquy, the prosecutor 
informed the court: 
 
The parties agree that the relevant quantity of 
cocaine base in determining Mr. James' offense 
level is 57.4 grams.  That's the total net weight 
of the crack cocaine that was purchased in each of 
the three transactions that comprise Counts One, 
Two and Three.  (emphasis added). 
  
               .           .           . 
 
Mr. James exchanged a plastic baggy that contained 
some suspected crack cocaine.  That was sent to a 
lab, analyzed, and was determined to be--I believe 
the net weight was 22.0 grams of cocaine base or 
crack cocaine.  (emphasis added). 
 
 
Thus, the Government contends that "there is no basis, in this 
case, for this Court to reach the question of law presented by 
James:  whether the statutory term cocaine base is broader than 
the Sentencing Guideline definition of cocaine base, and whether 
the government is therefore required to present evidence at 
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sentencing that the cocaine base at issue constitutes crack 
within the meaning of the Guidelines." 
 There can be no question that admissions to the court 
by a defendant during a guilty plea colloquy can be relied upon 
by the court at the sentencing stage.  The problem here, however, 
on this record, with the defendant and court speaking in terms of 
cocaine base, and the prosecutor referring to the cocaine base as 
crack, is whether the Government's characterization of the 
contraband constitutes a sufficient admission of the defendant 
under these circumstances that he possessed and sold crack merely 
because he answered "yes" to the prosecution's description of the 
crime. 
 A waiver of rights must be knowing and voluntary. See 
United States v. Newman, 912 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(voluntary plea requires real notice of the true nature of the 
charge).  Given the highly severe sentencing ratio of 100:1 for 
crack versus cocaine, James's sentence may vary dramatically 
depending on whether he sold crack or cocaine.  We do not believe 
that, without more, the casual reference to crack by the 
Government in the colloquy with the court over "the relevant 
quantity of cocaine base in determining Mr. James's offense 
level" unmistakably amounted to a knowing and voluntary admission 
that the cocaine base constituted crack.  Thus, this court must 
reach the issue of whether the Statutory Guidelines definition of 
"cocaine base" as "crack" required the Government to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the substance in question was 
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actually crack, especially in light of the enormously high 
punishment at risk in this determination. 
 At his sentencing hearing, James adopted the testimony 
of Dr. John David Alvin.3  Dr. Alvin testified extensively as to 
the chemical properties of cocaine and cocaine base.  Further, he 
testified that there are several ways of preparing cocaine base: 
 
A: [Y]ou wanted to know the various methods available 
 of creating or forming the cocaine base from the 
 hydrochloride salt. 
 
Q: That is correct. 
 
A: From the plant itself; from the hydrochloride 
 salt? 
 
Q: Yes. 
 
A: Yes, there are several methods depending upon, I 
 guess, the degree of sophistication you have 
 available to you.  One method is to take this salt 
 and alkalinize it, which means add some basic 
 material, an alkaline substance, to it which 
 converts it out of its salt form and its cocaine 
 form and base form and then one removes the 
 solvent and is left with a preparation that is a 
 relatively clean preparation of cocaine base. 
 
               .               .                  . 
 
Q: What is the Richard Pryor method? 
 A: The Richard Pryor method is a poor example of the 
 process I just described not using the best of 
 solvents and not using the materials that are 
 necessary, but it is another way of converting the 
 salt to the base.  Obviously it is dangerous; it 
 could be cleaner, but it is effective. 
 
                .            .           . 
  
Q: The cocaine base which is derived from that 
 method, how pure is that? 
                     
3
 Dr. Alvin testified as an expert witness in United States v. 
Church, Crim. No. 94-106. 
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A: On a scale from zero to 100 percent pure, which is 
 all you can get, the first procedure I described 
 to you is close to 100 percent as scientists can 
 get it by the sophisticated methods that the 
 scientists might use.  The method that apparently 
 Richard Pryor used will produce product whose 
 purity is purely dependent on how good that 
 person's technique is. . . . [I]t generally will 
 produce a substance that might be in the 80 to 90 
 percent range with regard to purity, which is the 
 best possible being 100 percent. 
 
Q: Okay.  And the government used the term 
 bicarbonate, I believe. 
 
A: Another method of converting, yes, probably the 
 least sophisticated.  Bicarbonate is an alkaline 
 substance and can produce the desired effect.  By 
 combining the powder hydrochloride with the 
 bicarbonate in a mashy solution and letting it 
 evaporate and letting it dry, you end up with the 
 base cocaine mixed with some bicarbonate. 
 
Q: And, again, approximately, can you designate any 
 kind of purity for this procedure, generally? 
 
A: The same rules apply.  It depends on how well it 
 is done and by whom.  But in my experience, that 
 material has been anywhere from 40-some to 70-some 
 percent pure. 
 
 
 James contends that only this last form of cocaine 
base, the sodium bicarbonate form, is subject to the sentencing 
enhancements.4  The parties discussed James's theory at length at 
the sentencing hearing.  The court concluded: 
 
                     
4As mentioned above, the Guidelines define cocaine base as 
"crack," "the street name for a form of cocaine base, usually 
prepared by processing cocaine hydrochloride and sodium 
bicarbonate, and usually appearing in a lumpy, rock like form." 
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 
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[I]t is my opinion and my finding, so that you 
have a record here, that cocaine base means crack 
for purposes of the guidelines.  
  
 In United States v. Munoz-Realpe, 21 F.3d 375 (11th 
Cir. 1994), the Court of Appeals addressed the impact of the 1993 
defining amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines.  In Munoz-
Realpe, the authorities arrested the defendant with six bottles 
containing a liquid that tested positive for cocaine base.  Id. 
at 376.  The district court treated the substance as cocaine 
hydrochloride under the Sentencing Guidelines and thus did not 
apply the enhanced sentence for crack cocaine or cocaine base. 
The appellate court affirmed.   
 The Munoz-Realpe court noted that, effective November 
1993, the Sentencing Commission amended Section 2D1.1 of the 
Guidelines to include the definition of crack as discussed above. 
The court asserted that the Commission was addressing an inter-
circuit conflict.  Prior to 1993, some courts held that cocaine 
base under the Guidelines included all forms of cocaine base, not 
just crack.  See United States v. Rodriguez, 980 F.2d 1375, 1378 
(11th Cir. 1992) (the term cocaine base is not limited to crack 
cocaine); United States v. Jackson, 968 F.2d 158, 161 (2nd Cir. 
1992) (forms of cocaine base not pure enough to be crack still 
fall within Guidelines for enhanced sentence).  The Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that, subsequent to the 1993 
definition amendment, other forms of cocaine base that are not 
crack should be treated as cocaine for sentencing purposes. 
Munoz-Realpe, 21 F.3d at 377.   
16 
 We find the Munoz-Realpe analysis to be persuasive. The 
Sentencing Commission defines cocaine base for sentencing 
purposes to mean the form of cocaine base commonly known as 
crack.  The Government failed to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the form of cocaine base James sold was actually 
crack.  Thus, it was error to apply the enhanced sentence for 
crack pursuant to Section 2D1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines.  
 
   
IV. 
 
 James further contends that this court should extend 
the Statutory Guidelines definition of cocaine base to the 
mandatory minimum sentencing provisions of 21 U.S.C. 
841(b)(1)(B)(iii).5  In Munoz-Realpe, the Court of Appeals 
extended the Sentencing Guidelines definition to the mandatory 
minimum sentencing provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 960(b).6  The court 
reasoned that Congress, through its acceptance of the Guidelines 
amendment, indicated that it intends the term "cocaine base" to 
include only crack cocaine.  Thus, the court deemed it proper to 
look to the Guidelines in determining the meaning of "cocaine 
base" in the mandatory minimum statute.  See Munoz-Realpe, 21 
                     
5If the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions for cocaine base 
do not apply, the court may sentence James to a range of 18 to 24 
months pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines provisions for 
crimes involving "non-crack" cocaine. 
621 U.S.C. § 960 provides the mandatory minimum sentences for the 
import or export of controlled substances.  Section 960(b) 
provides for an enhanced sentence for crimes involving cocaine 
base. 
17 
F.3d at 377-78.  In so holding, the Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit conflicted with the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals' holding in United States v. Palacia, 4 F.3d 150 (2nd 
Cir. 1993) (declining to reinterpret the Minimum Mandatory 
definition in the absence of new guidance from Congress.)  
 This court need not reach the issue of whether the 
Guidelines definition of cocaine base should extend to the 
mandatory minimum sentencing provisions.  James's plea agreement 
states that he sold cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§841(b)(1)(B)(iii).7  Thus, he is precluded from arguing that the 
mandatory minimum sentence should not apply.   
 
V. 
 
 In summary, the district court committed no error in 
rejecting the defendant's claim of double jeopardy.  The 
conviction of the defendant will be affirmed.  However, the court 
erred in its application of the Sentencing Guidelines enhancement 
for crack in absence of proof by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the form of cocaine base James sold was actually crack.  The 
defendant's sentence will be vacated and the case remanded for 
resentencing consistent with this opinion. 
                     
7Although James allegedly sold a total of 54.7 grams of cocaine 
base, he pled guilty to Count I, which charged him with 
distribution and possession with intent to distribute in excess 
of 5 grams of cocaine base.  Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 
§841(b)(1)(B)(iii), the appropriate sentence range is not less 
than 5 years, and not more than 40 years.   
18 
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. KEITH JAMES 
NO. 95-3135                             
 
STAPLETON, J., Concurring: 
 
 I join parts I, II, IV and V of the court's opinion.  I further agree with my 
colleagues that following the 1993 amendment, forms of cocaine base other than crack 
should be treated as cocaine for purposes of sentencing under the Guidelines. 
 I disagree only with that portion of part III holding that the district court 
was foreclosed from relying upon the defendant's apparent admission during his plea 
colloquy that he sold crack cocaine.  The majority concludes that because of the severity 
of the 100:1 sentencing ratio, a district court cannot rely on an apparent admission of 
the defendant in a plea colloquy unless a court of appeals, on review, believes that it 
"unmistakably amount[s] to a knowing and voluntary admission." In my view, the issue of 
whether James admitted to selling crack is an issue of fact.  Like all other issues of 
fact material to a sentencing decision, this is an issue for the district court subject 
only to clearly erroneous review by this court. Moreover, like all other such fact issues, 
it is to be decided by a preponderance of the evidence standard, not a higher one of 
unmistakability. 
 At the plea colloquy the prosecutor referred to the substance in question three 
times as "crack cocaine."  The court then asked, "Mr. James, you heard what [the 
prosecutor] just said about what you did.  Do you agree with what he said."  James 
responded, "yes."  The district court was in a far better position than we to determine as 
a matter of fact what James intended to affirm by this statement.  If the court had made 
an express finding that James intended to affirm that he sold crack and that, based on the 
preponderance of the evidence, crack was sold, I would be unable to say that the court's 
conclusions were clearly erroneous.   
20 
 It appears to me from the transcript of the sentencing hearing that the district 
judge concluded that James intended to admit selling crack.  It also appears that he 
relied upon this finding when he determined by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
substance was crack.  Were I sure that this is what transpired in the district court, I 
would affirm.  The transcript is less than clear, however, and I would remand for 
clarification from the district court.  On remand, the district court, if it so chose, 
could affirm or disaffirm a factual finding that James admitted selling crack and, if it 
affirmed, could rely upon that finding in resentencing.  In the alternative, the district 
court, in its discretion, could elect to hear further evidence regarding the composition 
of the substance sold.  While the government is not to be routinely granted two 
opportunities to carry its burden at a sentencing hearing, a reopening of the record could 
be justifiable here because the government, at the original sentencing hearing, was 
clearly operating under the assumption, arguably reasonable, that James had conceded that 
the relevant substance was crack cocaine.  See United States v. Dickler, 64 F.3d 818, 832 
(3d Cir. 1995). 
 
